Mad Libertarianism

July 3, 2008 § 42 Comments

As a kid I used to get a kick out of Mad Libs, those little stories with blanks to fill in with a noun, verb, or adjective. With my short attention span (once you’ve gotten an MBA you are incapable of spending more than 30 seconds on an ‘executive summary’ or ‘elevator pitch’ without prodigious effort) I thought I’d limit today’s game to a single sentence, with a single word substitution, inspired by a commenter. Our sentence is:

A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while ________ is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized.

Have fun, kids.

Tagged:

§ 42 Responses to Mad Libertarianism

  • discalcedyooper says:

    patricide and matricide (Although I’m in the criminalization camp, I thought I would find an example where there are a surprising number of people who don’t think it should be punished.)

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    I don’t get that. There are a surprising number of people who think that if I shoot my mother or father in the head, it shouldn’t be punished? Patricide and matricide?

  • ben says:

    Lydia,I believe MZ is referring to starving our dehydrating one’s parent’s, or killing them with an overdose of morphene, not shooting them.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    I wondered if that was it. But unfortunately that applies to killing all sorts of people–one’s disabled (aka “vegetative”) child or any other relative or even any ward over whom one has powers of guardianship. It isn’t particularly patricide or matricide, and there are of course other forms of patricide and matricide, so that was why I was thrown by the specific fill-in.Actually, and also most unfortunately, people who defend dehydrating or over-medicating helpless people will usually strongly deny that it is a form of deliberate premeditated murder. They’ll insist it’s just “letting the person die” or something like that.

  • zippy says:

    Now now, we should play the game by its rules. The Mad Libertarian says “would be a perfectly valid position for someone to hold”, not “is a position some people in fact hold”.<>…will usually strongly deny that it is a form of deliberate premeditated murder.<>Right — but the interesting thing about how the game is posed, is that it asks those who believe it (whatever is filled in the blank) to be premeditated murder in fact.There are a great many people who claim to see abortion and euthenasia as deliberate premeditated murder, but who don’t act and associate as if they really do think it is deliberate premeditated murder.

  • discalcedyooper says:

    I was making a reference to the Menendez brothers who were acquitted in part due to having become orphans. At the cultural level, I would say fratricide is accepted in Middle Eastern culture, although the act is supposed to be an approximation of justice. I have to drop out of the game though since I have work I have to do, but I thought a the least some elaboration was needed. I do think the exercise is useful.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    Okay, I’ll fill in the blank to make the sentence something that others–mad libertarians, in fact–might say, though of course I don’t:“A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while suicide is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized.”

  • Anonymous says:

    Ok — I’ll take a shot:A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while “<>death penalty<>” is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized.e.

  • zippy says:

    I like the creativity, but <>validity<> would depend on (suicide | the death penalty) actually being a form of murder. I don’t think either one is, though suicide makes me go ‘hmmm’.

  • Anonymous says:

    Zippy,Isn’t deliberately putting an end to another person’s life the very definition of ‘murder’?

  • zippy says:

    <>Isn’t deliberately putting an end to another person’s life the very definition of ‘murder’?<>No.

  • Anonymous says:

    How do u define ‘murder’ then?

  • zippy says:

    Murder is killing an innocent person, or unlawfully killing a guilty person.In a sense that just shifts the burden to the terms ‘innocent’ and ‘unlawful’. A person is not innocent if he is choosing or has chosen an attacking behavior, to which our act is a defensive response. (He can’t be guilty of just anything in some general sense: our act has to be a defensive response to his specific attacking act).Even killing the guilty is significantly circumscribed, though: <>unlawfully<> killing the guilty is also murder. If killing force is disproportionate, that is, is not required to stop the attack or carry out justice, then it is morally illicit. Aquinas believed that even in the case of the guilty, one is only authorized to kill if one is acting as the legitimate agent of the common good, never on one’s own behalf.But in any event, the <>moral<> term ‘murder’ cannot be reduced to the physicalist sense of the term ‘kill’

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    It has been fairly traditional in “old books” to use the phrase ‘self murder’ for suicide, and it has always seemed apt to me. To say that suicide is a form of murder–killing someone who, while not innocent of all sin in some global sense, has not committed a crime deserving of the death penalty–seems to me the best way to express why it is wrong. The only case this makes difficult is the case of a murderer who commits suicide out of remorse. But let’s stipulate that we are talking about suicide of a person who is depressed, has received word that he is terminally ill, or is getting old and does not want to lose his independence. We can stipulate that the person has done no heinous crime that would even plausibly qualify for the death penalty and that he doesn’t believe that he has but is killing himself for one of the above reasons. And of course, suicide _is_ wrong.

  • Anonymous says:

    Zippy,I like your thoughtful formulation or, at least, consideration of the term ‘murder’.I would like to bring special attention to the following in your remarks:“…our act has to be a defensive response to his specific attacking act”“If killing force is disproportionate, that is, is not required to stop the attack or carry out justice, then it is morally illicit.”This is the very reason why for my ‘mad libs’, I put in there ‘death penalty’.Strictly speaking, in the case of defense, killing the villain is morally licit and, further, becomes an absolute necessity in defense of the innocent.However, in the case where the criminal act of murder(s) by such villains had already transpired; considering the aforementioned, killing him/her may not really be regarded as an acceptable killing by stricter standards; that is, it can arguably be categorized as ‘murder’ given stringent deliberation of the act that is the ‘death penalty’.

  • zippy says:

    Well, a death penalty traditionalist would argue with some plausibility that (1) killing the condemned <>does<> protect society, and is necessary, since (e.g.) convicts do in fact sometimes kill prison guards and each other, not merely people on the ‘outside’; and (2) that redressing the wrong done in a commensurate way <>is<> necessary in order to protect society, since justice is in fact necessary for a healthy society.I have some sympathy for that point of view. On the other hand I’m inclined to think that there are serious difficulties with our ability to punish justly in even non-death-penalty cases. If you gave me a choice to spend forty years being sodomized by cell-mate Grossburger versus death, I’d probably take death. (The old joke goes ‘very well, we pronounce the penalty of death — by forty years of sodomy’). It is no joke though that sodomy by fellow prisoners is (just an example of) a real part of the implicit threat of incarceration in modern America. So I am not nearly as sanguine about our ability to punish justly as some are. I do have what Lydia might call ‘retributivist’ tendencies – that is, I think the purpose of punishment is in part the restoration of justice to the extent allowed by temporal conditions. But it is one of those things that are very difficult to carry out in practice without becoming something we ought not become.

  • William Luse says:

    <>there are serious difficulties with our ability to punish justly in even non-death-penalty cases.<>The death penalty might actually be the easier call, since the punishment so obviously fits the gravity of the offense. Finding the right number of years to incarcerate a thief is tougher.<>I think the purpose of punishment is in part the restoration of justice to the extent allowed by temporal conditions.<>Maybe you meant ‘primarily’ rather than ‘in part.’<>it is one of those things that are very difficult to carry out in practice without becoming something we ought not become.<>Which is what, exactly? A couple of days ago Florida executed (i.e., put peacefully to sleep) < HREF="http://www.cfnews13.com/News/Sidebar/2008/7/1/timeline_of_the_mark_schwab_case.html" REL="nofollow">Mark Schwab<> for raping and killing an 11 year old boy. What did we become by doing that?To fill in your blank: A perfectly valid position for Obama to hold is that, while <>stabbing a baby in the back of the head with surgical scissors while that head is still in the birth canal and his body is out<> is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized. Wait. You wanted one word, didn’t you?

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    Go, Bill.Nobody is sentenced to being sodomized by fellow prisoners, Zippy. And I have a solution for that problem, anyway: A broader use of the death penalty to reduce prison crowding by heinous criminals and solitary confinement for everybody who commits a crime bad enough to be put in a maximum security prison. And, yes, I’ll pay more in taxes for the solitary cells if necessary, though I can think of cuts in government I’d like to see made first.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    You can solve the “one-word” problem by putting it in the background. Here’s one, for Barack Obama. Let us stipulate that the born infants we’re talking about are premies and are below some gestational age such that Mr. Obama thinks the Constitution says (or the court says the Constitution says, and this is something we must meaningfully defer to) that they *are not persons*. So, for those infants, the Obama-ite position appears to be…“A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while infanticide is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized.”Oh, wait. If he thinks the court can declare them non-persons, then maybe he wouldn’t acknowledge it to be murder to kill them.This is harder than it seems.I mean, you could just fill them in a la the original poster:“A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while lynching blacks is a form of deliberate premeditated murder, it need not be criminalized.”But I’m not sure that’s as clever as coming up with one that people actually think.

  • zippy says:

    <>Maybe you meant ‘primarily’ rather than ‘in part.’<>It really is in part, I think: that is, in part to protect from <>further<> harm, and in part to redress (and also minimize the ‘ripple effect’ of) <>already inflicted<> harm.There are two additional ‘modes’ here: the obvious one to moderns is the harm (past and future) to individuals. There is also harm to the common good, though, or to justice itself, in a failure to mete out just punishment; a harm which deserves independent consideration.<>Which is what, exactly?<>Vengeful, for one. I have a very difficult time even thinking about cases like that one without becoming vengeful. It is part of the reason I tend to avoid discussion of the death penalty.

  • zippy says:

    <>Nobody is sentenced to being sodomized by fellow prisoners, Zippy. <>De jure, no, but de facto, yes. And everyone knows it.I agree though (and I think we’ve discussed this before) that leniency in the penal system is not mercy: that sometimes the more merciful (or perhaps just more humane) thing to do is to be less lenient.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    I’m absolutely horrified by the whole sodomy in the prisons thing. And one thing that baffles me is the way that there is no consideration of much greater restraint on prisoner movement as a means to prevent it. I can’t tell how much of the neglect of that solution is a matter of cost consideration and how much is because, crazily enough, the ACLU or whatever would start howling about how “cruel” it was to keep prisoners in much smaller quarters and with much less social interaction among themselves to protect them from each other. We live in a crazy world.But that’s all right; I won’t thread-jack. We can go back to filling in the blank on the sentence in question. 🙂

  • On the blog you hate so much, our participants do not propose utilitarian solutions to prison overcrowindg such as… killing the prisoners. I think there are too many old people too, consuming valuable resources.And ou sucumb to a basic error by assuming that retribution is not something added to punishment. Here is the great Elizabeth Anscombe:“A retributive theory of punishment is merely a punishment theory of punishment; therefore correct, in that it declares that nothing can be properly called punishment if it is not offered as affliction deserved by ill-doing; but incorrect, in that it says that punishment of wrongdoing is eo ipso justified and needs no further reason.”She concluded that when punishment is not strictly based on the need to protect people, then it becomes an abuse of state power– and when the state abuses power, force becomes violence, and violence is sinful. She anticipated John Paul by two decades on this one. She anticipated Veritatis Splendour too by coining the term consequentialism.

  • zippy says:

    If you want to comment here, MM, you really need to quote-and-respond. Nobody has suggested either of your straw-men, that I’ve noticed; or if they have, I don’t trust you to accurately characterize the statement without actually quoting and responding to what someone actually said.At W4 I was content to just refute your stupid mischaracterizations of what Brendon said. Here I am not going to put up with you putting what you wish other people were saying into their mouths – because it would be so much more convenient for your ‘arguments’. Quote or get out.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    I know exactly what he’s talking about. But I’m not fazed, because I believe the death penalty is in fact used far less in the U.S. than justice would (at a minimum) permit and (at a maximum) requires, and hence that many in the prison system have received a degree of “mercy” (if it is that) that they doubtless do not deserve, where justice, society, and (in a strange but true sense) they themselves would have been better served if they had received that justice–i.e., a death sentence. Hence my comment which so offended MM.But I also have the feeling that Zippy would prefer that this thread were not wrenched to an argument over the death penalty.In fact, it might be _less_ of a misdirection of the thread to argue over why suicide is wrong. I filled in suicide for Zippy’s blank because I’ve known a libertarian who actually _took_ the position that suicide is wrong (I don’t know if he would have agreed that it is murder, but he certainly agreed that it is wrong) but should not be illegal. In one of my only argumentative victories in politics in my life, I convinced him otherwise–that is, that it should in fact be illegal.

  • zippy says:

    OK, I missed the comment somehow. I most definitely and firmly disagree with this, and I’m surprised that you would say it as a real rather than polemical statement:<>A broader use of the death penalty to reduce prison crowding…<>I don’t think the DP should ever hinge on a utilitarian consideration like prison crowding, until we’ve been reduced to hunter-gatherer status and are literally incapable of protecting ourselves otherwise. Killing a man, even justly, is a serious matter: very few matters are more serious. I have to side with MM on the substance of his objection, and apologize for missing the obvious.But yeah, it was not my intention to make this thread about the DP. I could modify the Mad Lib as follows:A perfectly valid position for somebody to hold is that, while ________ is a form of deliberate premeditated murder of the innocent, it need not be criminalized.Suicide is an interesting case. I was thinking more along the lines of Bill’s ‘fill-in’ when I wrote the post.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    I put it flippantly. I should perhaps say more accurately that, by not engaging in the just execution of the heinously guilty, we have created other, practical, problems for ourselves. These other problems are therefore, whatever else they are, certainly not arguments that we are “too harsh” on prisoners. They are rather a result of our misguided attempts not to be too harsh. I didn’t mean, as might well have been taken by the flippant wording, that we should pick people at random and engage in the death penalty because we have crowded prisons but rather that a just social order overall, including the execution of those who deserve it, would have as one of its effects that we would have less of this particular problem which is now being used as an argument for the “cruelty” of our justice system. I apologize for being in “in your face” mode and making the comment in the way that I did.Back to our regular programing. As the nearest to Bill’s, I suggest my lynching fill-in.

  • William Luse says:

    <>It really is in part, I think<>It can be ‘in part’ and ‘primary’ at the same time. If the need to protect against further harm were equal to, or weighed heavier in the balance, we might never be justified in inflicting the penalty.<>I have a very difficult time even thinking about cases like that one without becoming vengeful.<>That’s why we put it in the hands of a duly constituted authority. Your desire for vegeance is your problem, not the justice system’s. It’s a common human affliction we all have to combat, and not only in death penalty cases.But your criticism of MM should not be retracted, at least as regards his “paraphrasing” of Anscombe, whose conclusion, says he, is that “when punishment is not strictly based on the need to protect people, then it becomes an abuse of state power.” Those are his words, not hers. I have trouble believing she said it because it’s <>not Catholic teaching<>. She was in fact ambivalent about the DP, not considering it indispensable, but I doubt for the reason he gives. And by now I don’t trust him to paraphrase anyone.In any event, he completely sidestepped your fill-in-the-blank exercise.

  • zippy says:

    <>But your criticism of MM should not be retracted, at least as regards his “paraphrasing” of Anscombe, …<>Sure. That point I just didn’t address at all.<>And by now I don’t trust him to paraphrase anyone.<>Ditto.

  • zippy says:

    I suppose I need to face the fact that discussions go where they will.Briefly (I hope):<>If the need to protect against further harm were equal to, or weighed heavier in the balance, we might never be justified in inflicting the penalty.<>I would point out that ‘further harm’ is ambiguous. Further harm carries forward from past acts. IOW, “future acts” and “further harm” are not synonyms. A wrong act is just a beginning, is just the dropping of a rock in the pool, rippling outward into reality. Those ripples affect individuals, and they affect the common good. So protection against further harm is not the same thing as ‘prevention of future acts’.That is why a plea bargain is dramatically different from torture, despite a concerted effort on the part of many to confuse them. In a plea bargian, we are going to sentence a perpetrator to a punishment which we will carry out, after his conviciton; perhaps even execution. If he chooses to act in such a way as to mitigate the harm rippling out from his act, we may be more lenient without that lenience being unjust, precisely because in the plea bargain the condemned is willingly acting to mitigate the evil he set into motion. This is the case for <>all<> crimes, not merely for the crime of planting a ticking bomb.An offer of lenience with respect to a punishment we are planning to carry out on a convicted criminal is not in any way comparable to torture. The reason why is precisely because a plea bargain is itself, like punishment, an act directed toward the restoration of justice, that is, the prevention of the harm caused when evil goes unpunished. Basically, the condemned’s cooperation in the restoration of justice, equivalent to minimizing the harm of and making up for (to the extent temporally possible) a past act, mitigates what is proportionately required – as an objective matter – in punishment. Christianity is in a sense the ultimate ‘plea bargain’ – we are forgiven our justly deserved punishment for sin and rebellion against God, and though there is nothing we can do <>as an act<> to ‘make up’ for rebellion against an infinitely good God our <>willingness<> combined with Christ’s <>act<> is sufficient.Now maybe those who read all that won’t buy it. That is fine. But at any rate it must be conceded that ‘prevention of future harm’ and ‘prevention of future harmful acts’ do not refer to the same thing. So one’s understanding of justice and punishment must take that into consideration.

  • Paraprasing? Oh, I think not. It’s all in her essay on the state. Here’s another quote:“For even if (which one may doubt) there is something intrinsically good about an evil-doer’s suffering, what is one man or some set of men that they should bring this about? Are they so good themselves? And are they in charge of the order of things, to see to it that such a good is brought about? It is obvious nonsense. The justification of the institutions of law, charge, trial, and sentence can only be the protection of people.”I would point out that before I even read Elizabeth’s essay on this subject, her interpretation was told to me by someone who was her close personal friend, and who was well acquainted by her thought.And on the particular death penalty point on which I think we agree: the next time you try to pin Gerald Campbell’s views on me or anybody else at Vox Nova, just remember the views of some of your own friends and co-bloggers.

  • zippy says:

    <>…the next time you try to pin Gerald Campbell’s views on me or anybody else at Vox Nova, just remember the views of some of your own friends and co-bloggers.<>Other than the part about me immediately and unequivocally objecting to what Lydia said as soon as I became aware of it, yeah, I suppose other than that we’re just exactly alike.

  • SB says:

    It does seem that Zippy has the intellectual courage and honesty to disagree with his co-bloggers. At least MM’s pattern of changing the subject re: his co-bloggers is less contemptible than Henry Karlson’s misrepresentations of what Gerald Campbell said.

  • “Other than the part about me immediately and unequivocally objecting..”Not so fast. The “immediate” effect was for you to assume I was mispresenting her, because you clearly hadn’t bothered to read what she said. Shoot first, ask questions later. It was only because she had the honestly to declare her position that you changed your mind. Now, if you had bothered to do the same with Brendon last week (who possessed no such honesty) — instead of immediately assuming I was in the wrong– then we could have avoided a lot of nonsense.

  • Lydia McGrew says:

    Zippy and I have the intellectual courage and honesty to disagree with one another all the time. 🙂

  • zippy says:

    MM:<>The “immediate” effect was for you to assume I was mispresenting her, …<>Yes, but that was just because I was considering the source — you. My habituated expectation when you paraphrase people is that you are full of it. (Notice that if you had <>quoted<> what she actually said, that wouldn’t have been a problem).I argue against generic ‘notions’ all the time; but if I attach that notion to a person, I try to always do so with a quote. As a result I have far fewer convenient straw men in my arguments; but I view that as a feature.Lydia:Not to mention that we don’t go around representing your point of view, nor even my point of view, nor the POV of W4, nor even this personal blog, as “Catholic Perspectives on Culture, Society, and Politics”Debate Club at Auschwitz may well be the perspectives of a bunch of Catholics, but it isn’t particularly Catholic perspectives.

  • William Luse says:

    “Further harm” was your term, which I took at face value, though I see in your first response that you tried to draw the distinction: “…harm to the common good, though, or to justice itself, in a failure to mete out just punishment; a harm which deserves independent consideration.” This is true, of course, so it seems that by ‘further harm’ your concern is with an injury to justice, which is mine as well. Before all other considerations, applying the DP must be a just and good kind of thing to do, or else we can’t do it at all. Its goodness can be corrupted by circumstances, of course, and I’m going on the assumption that in general, in this country, it is not. But MM’s position is that it can only be used as a means of self-defense for the rest of society (which I trust is not your position) if there is no other means of thus restraining the malefactor. But this strikes me as wicked, for it would mean that it is licit to execute A for what he <>might<> do to B, when the measure of a man’s punishment ought to be meted out only for what he has actually done. To prove that MM’s cherry-picking his quotes and distorting Anscombe’s overall purpose (to establish the basis of the state’s right, its authority, to ‘bear the sword’ on our behalf) in a long and very complicated essay, I’ll offer Anscombe’s words from the conclusion of the essay to which he refers: <>…authority in the command of violence is based on its performance of a task which is a general human need. A way of treating someone which puts him outside the class of those for whom the task is performed<> [say, torturing him -me]<> puts him outside the class of those subject to the authority. It is arguable that the death penalty for crimes does itself do this, but also arguable <>(I think successfully)<> that it does not.<>

  • vjiwjsdz says:

    Oh, am I mistaken, or has MM yet to fill in your blank?

  • zippy says:

    <>This is true, of course, so it seems that by ‘further harm’ your concern is with an injury to justice, which is mine as well. Before all other considerations, applying the DP must be a just and good kind of thing to do, or else we can’t do it at all.<>Said differently (I think), temporal punishment is not strictly about the prevention of future specific acts: it is about defending – to the extent possible temporally – against an injury inflicted by a prior act. People often take ‘punishment to defend individuals and the common good’ to mean ‘prevent a future act on the part of the perpetrator’. That is a natural thing for modern people raised in a materialist society to think, but it can’t mean that.Mind you, my own thoughts on punishment are far from being sorted out into a comprehensive theory of justice that I am convinced applies universally. But I have a pretty good idea of some things which <>can’t<> be true. An example is that ‘defend society from the criminal’ cannot refer merely and solely to restraining his future acts. His sword-thrust into the heart of justice continues until he faces just punishment. With his cooperation that can be more lenient than without, to be sure, since by his own efforts he attempts to reverse to the extent possible what is done, or expresses his will to do so in some act, such an expression <>in itself<> accomplishing at least some degree of reversal. Voluntary remorseful acts do help to repair an injury done to the common good; help to stop its forward propogation, if you will. But it remains a defense <>against his past act<> that we are talking about primarily.I detest the language of ‘deterrence’, because it turns punishment into a utilitarian thing. But deterrence, while in itself a bunch of hooey when it comes to justifying a punishment, it related to what I am talking about here. The perpetrator has injured society (not only individuals) by his act, and if we treat what he did as <>the kind of thing one can do and get away with<> then we are cooperating in his act of injuring society. The merciful and good thing to do <>on his behalf, even if he is unwilling<> is to repair that to the extent possible. So in the end, a just punishment is all three things: a defense of individuals; a defense of society; and a defense of what is objectively good for the perpetrator himself, independent of what he wills. This cannot be reduced to ‘prevention of future acts’.

  • zippy says:

    vjiwjsdz: You are not mistaken.Part of the point is to highlight whether or not folks really do believe that (e.g.) abortion and euthenasia are forms of deliberate, premeditated murder of the innocent. Actions and affiliations speak rather louder than words in many human endeavors. That is partly why lynching blacks and infanticide make such great counterpoint examples. Would someone who is willing to ‘work with’ pro-aborts be just as willing – and be open about that willingness – to ‘work with’ someone who expressly lobbies for a right to kill the poor, or Jews, or some other slice of humanity? If not, doesn’t that show that the person doesn’t really believe the de fide doctrine that abortion and euthenasia are murder?

  • William Luse says:

    Them’s a lot of words to wade through to find the three or four saying that the DP is (all other requirements being met) a just and good kind of act. I didn’t see them but maybe you said it in different words. In any case, let’s let it go for now. The comment from ‘vjiwjsdz’ was mine. I must have forgotten to sign my name.And if you spell euthanasia with an ‘e’ one more time I’m going to kill myself.

  • zippy says:

    <>…the DP is (all other requirements being met) a just and good kind of act.<>That is a given. What is interesting, as with all prudential judgements, is ‘what precisely are those requirements’ and ‘are those requirements met in specific case X’ This is distinct from authenasia, which is always wrong. 😮

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